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1 Background to the initiative 
There are three streams of work under the Accountable Grant theme of women and girls, 
one of which is collective action around gender-based violence (GBV). GBV here refers to 
the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) 
definition as per Article 1: ‘Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life’.1 While we recognise that in most cases, women tend to be disproportionately 
affected by such forms of violence, nevertheless, we argue that the definition above needs to 
be used to refer to GBV as affecting both women and men. 
 
The work on collective action in the face of gender-based violence seeks to understand the 
extent to which GBV can become a community issue that engages men in challenging and 
confronting violent and abusive behaviour towards women, and through which notions of 
masculinity, manhood and identity are broached. It is important to note here that ‘engages 
men’ does not only mean the participation of men as ‘objects’ of awareness-raising 
interventions or activities led by women. It also means men, alongside women, assuming 
ownership and leadership of initiatives that challenge social norms and values in societies 
that endorse or are tolerant of GBV. We will examine the relationship between GBV, 
collective action and masculinities through six country case studies examined over four 
years. Three main activities will feature in each country case study: 
 
 a database of interventions on GBV which presents a brief profile and contact 
information of all the collective actors working on one or more types of gender-based 
violence in a particular country that is readily available to all; 
 a scoping activity with local partners on actors and interventions to address GBV, and 
the documentation of one or more case study initiatives that highlight important 
lessons to inform more effective policies in this area; 
 a critical analysis of these initiatives. 
 
1.1 Case study approaches 
1.1.1  
Close consultation with local partners, and the promotion of co-construction of knowledge in 
terms of defining the forms of GBV that are most relevant at the country level and 
understanding and analysing strategies of engagement. Co-construction of knowledge on 
GBV here means working with partners to develop concepts and frameworks inductively from 
their own experiences and realities, as opposed to working deductively by imposing a top-
down framework of analysis which they seek to apply to their realities.  
The strength of such an inductive approach is that it allows the development of approaches 
that are sensitive to changing realities and does not assume they can be accommodated by 
universal models of analysis. 
                                               
1
 www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2009/2009_add_gen_vio.pdf 
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1.1.2 The use of corroboration and triangulation to ensure the validity and 
rigour of the findings and analysis 
 
The issues emanating from the workshop were corroborated with secondary data analysis on 
GBV. In selecting the key interventions that would represent the focus on activity 3.3.22 of the 
accountable grant, we did not only rely on the workshop participants’ perceptions of the 
actors who are most influential in making a difference in addressing GBV but also consulted 
more broadly with key gender experts and activists from movements that were not 
represented in the workshop. 
 
1.1.3 The use of participatory approaches to encourage active engagement 
from different groups 
 
A variety of participatory methods such as mapping of actors and relationships were used at 
all stages of knowledge production (see the methodology Section 5 for application). 
 
1.1.4 The use of power analysis where relevant to provide a deeper and 
more ‘layered’ analysis of issues at hand 
 
Power analysis tools and frameworks were introduced in a selective manner (see 
methodology Section 5 for application in the Egyptian context). 
 
1.1.5 Researchers at IDS working on the different country case studies will 
work collaboratively to design the research in such a way as to allow 
for cross-country comparisons 
 
For example, the template for use in the database will be adapted to different country case 
studies; the stakeholder mapping workshop will be informed by similar approaches for 
engaging participants and the country case studies will seek to answer a core set of 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 Issuance of a report on the most effective interventions led by informal youth initiatives to counter gender-
based violence in public spaces. 
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2 Background to the Egypt country case study 
2.1 Rationale for selection: 
1. Egypt was selected as one of the six country case studies for examining collective 
action on GBV for a number of reasons. 
 
2. Egypt is one of the most important countries geo-strategically in the Arab region, and 
the nature and outcome of its transition from authoritarian rule will have important 
implications not only for its own citizenry but also for other countries witnessing 
revolts. 
 
3. While DFID does not have a country office in Egypt it has a large and politically 
significant initiative, the Arab Partnership, in which gender equality is identified as an 
area of concern and engagement. 
 
4. IDS has strong contacts with various stakeholders in Egypt and has a long history of 
successful engagement with partners. 
 
5. There has been a proliferation of citizens organising through collective action for 
various causes, hence, this offers an excellent opportunity to examine the dynamics 
of organising as they unfold. 
 
6. There has been an intense backlash against women’s rights in Egypt since the 2011 
revolution. The examination of interventions seeking to address heightened levels of 
GBV therefore carries important policy messages for countries in transition. 
 
The Egyptian Revolution, instigated on 25 January 2011, saw the participation and 
leadership of women in the bid to oust Mubarak from power and demand ‘freedom, justice 
and dignity’ for all. Accordingly, there were raised expectations that women’s agency would 
be recognised by the post-Mubarak state and society alike, through increased opportunities 
for leadership and more egalitarian attitudes towards citizenship rights for all, irrespective of 
gender. However, the past two years has witnessed a backlash against women’s equality, 
reflected in: 
 
 the exclusion of women from leading decision-making positions and processes, in 
particular in government; 
 the drop of women’s representation in parliament from 13 per cent in the 2010 
parliament to 2 per cent in that of 2011, even though the number of women 
campaigning for office had doubled from 2010 under Mubarak to 2011 in the first 
post-Mubarak elections; 
 the amplification of voices in politically influential positions demanding the revision of 
family law and child law in order to reverse the gains made in previous years, such as 
calling for the decriminalisation of female genital mutilation, the removal of women’s 
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arbitrary right to divorce through khul’3 and the reduction of the minimum age of 
marriage; 
 the diffusion of socially conservative discourses that demand women’s restricted 
presence in public space, and their abidance by a particular moral and social code of 
behaviour (see Section 8 on ‘places of worship’). 
 
At the heart of the backlash against women’s rights is the configuration of power that 
emerged when Mubarak was ousted. The Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) which 
took over rule did not actively seek to incorporate into the new government sections of the 
population that had previously been marginalised, such as women, youth and non-Muslims. 
SCAF’s evasion of accountability for its highly exclusionary policies was made possible by 
the lack of solidarity among the various actors who were demanding their rights. In the case 
of women’s situation, women’s organisations were too fragmented to present a united front to 
SCAF. They also did not have relationships with political parties and other politically active 
groups that would give them political weight. Consequently, they had minimal bargaining 
power to influence the political settlement that was in the making during the first phase of the 
transition. 
 
 In the second phase of the transition, marked by the Islamists’ ascendency to power through 
the parliamentary and presidential elections, the backlash against women was maintained 
and deepened. For example, there was no official condemnation on the part of the ruling 
powers of the growing assault on women in public spaces in Egypt, which ranged from 
sexual harassment to cutting young girls’ hair in attempts to intimidate them to wear the veil. 
 
The backlash against women is taking place against a backdrop of a high level of political 
volatility and lax security. Rule of law is weak, and citizens continue to feel very vulnerable to 
assaults on the street from organised gangs, thugs and criminals. Shortly after the initiation 
of the workshop in early November, an escalation of violence erupted in Mohamed Mahmoud 
Street in downtown Cairo when police clashed with youth protestors. This was followed by a 
political crisis of significant magnitude following President Morsi’s announcement of a series 
of edicts which allow for a concentration of executive, judiciary and legislative powers in his 
hands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 The right of women to unilaterally divorce men through a court system by forgoing some of their financial 
rights (though not those rights relating to their children).  
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3 Gender-based violence as a priority issue in 
the Egyptian context 
From the mid-2000s up to the ousting of Mubarak, the national women’s machinery, The 
National Council for Women and many non-governmental organisations worked on 
combating domestic violence, largely through research, awareness-raising interventions and 
lobbying the government for the issuance of a law (which never materialised). While 
domestic violence continues to be an issue in the Egyptian context, as in most other 
countries, Egyptian men and women shifted their attention after the revolution to focus on 
sexual harassment as one of the key forms of gender-based violence which women became 
particularly vulnerable to. This is not to suggest that exposure to sexual harassment 
suddenly emerged as an issue after the revolution, it has been a widespread phenomenon 
for a while. For example, a survey conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights in 
2008 indicated that 83 per cent of female respondents said they have been exposed to 
sexual harassment and 50 per cent said that they are exposed to it on a daily basis. 
 
However, the lax security situation and the increased pervasiveness of a highly misogynist 
discourse towards women, primarily, though not exclusively, disseminated by Islamists 
seems to have made matters worse. The author’s own research through focus groups in 
Cairo (Fayoum, El Minya, Beni Suef and Qena) shows that women have experienced an 
increase in the frequency and type of harassment in the past two years: namely, that they 
are more vulnerable to being sexually harassed more often, and it is becoming more daring 
(more groping/touching/attempted removal of clothing). 
 
This is corroborated by further evidence from research undertaken by the Centre for 
Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA). In late 2012 CEWLA conducted a survey in 
seven governorates (Aswan, Sohag, Qena, Asiut, Cairo, Fayoum and El Minya) with 476 
persons answering the questionnaires (205 women and 271 men). The results revealed that 
at the top of the list of issues that were identified as affecting women’s situation after 25 
January were: 
 
1. The deteriorating economic situation; 
2. Sexual harassment; 
3. The kidnapping of women. 
 
Hence sexual harassment features prominently as one of the prime concerns. When asked 
what undermines their sense of security in the period post-25 January revolution, 21 per cent 
of respondents said the absence of security personnel in the streets, 19 per cent cited their 
exposure to sexual harassment, 10 per cent said the prevalence of arms and weapons, and 
another 10 per cent said unemployment (as the most common answers). As to how the 
streets can become a safe space once again, among the top responses: 20 per cent said the 
presence of a fair and capable security force able to withstand criminals in society, 16 per 
cent said the issuance of a law that protects women from sexual harassment, and 12 per 
cent said the speedy trials of criminals and the detention of those who had escaped from 
prison. 
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What is clear though is that gender-based violence on the streets of Egypt has become a 
pressing concern affecting citizens in a very tangible manner. In response to the absence of 
security on the streets, some of the women interviewed in focus groups mentioned that one 
of the responses that some families took to protect them from harassment was to prevent 
their daughters from going to schools or universities. Other responses have been to not allow 
women to go out unaccompanied, and to press them to carry tools to use as self-defence. 
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4 The scoping workshop 
What is critically important to remember is the political moment in which this workshop was 
being held. It was at a time shortly after President Morsi had assumed leadership of the 
country (in July 2012) and a political rift had appeared between supporters of the Islamists 
versus those that opposed them. At the time of the workshop the two most critical issues 
being discussed vis-à-vis women’s rights were the drawing up of the constitution and the 
fight against gender-based violence in public spaces. 
 
The Institute of Development Studies in collaboration with the Centre for Egyptian Women’s 
Legal Assistance (CEWLA)4 held a workshop at the Safir Hotel Dokki Cairo on 4 November 
and a follow-up roundtable on 5 November on CEWLA premises in Bulaq al Dakrour. 
 
4.1 The aims of the scoping workshop 
 To bring together activists to identify the most acute forms of GBV in the Egyptian 
context; 
 To undertake a mapping of actors influencing GBV, both positively and negatively; 
 To discuss strategies for confronting GBV and engage with those using collective 
action and who work with men. 
4.1.1 Workshop participants 
There were 23 participants at the workshop including: 
 
 informal youth groups (vigilante groups) who were active in the anti-sexual 
harassment campaigns launched during the Eid period and more generally in public 
spaces such as Emsek Moutaharesh, Baheya Ya Misr, Shoft Moutaheresh and 
Fouada Watch; 
 members of formal coalitions and NGOs such as the coalition for ending violence 
against women and the New Woman Foundation, Association for the Protection of 
the Environment in Asiut, Women's Development Association in Qena, Association of 
Wadi el Nil for Development in Luxor; 
 political activists such as Samira Ibrahim (activist who launched case against the 
military's use of a virginity test against her). 
 
 
 
                                               
4
 In view of the increasing restrictions on non-governmental organisations receiving foreign funding, the funding 
for the workshop was channelled through a law firm specialising in human rights ‘Lawyers for Justice and 
Peace’.  
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5 Workshop Day One 
5.1 Methodological approach 
A combination of power analysis, ranking and mapping methods were used and integrated 
with a view to moving away from an ‘extractive’ format for the workshop where participants 
are being asked to volunteer information without any benefits to themselves. For example, 
one of the first tasks that different groups in the workshop embarked on was to draw on 
flipchart paper all the actors they associated with GBV, whether as perpetrators, inciters, 
protectors, justice restorers, etc. Participants discussed the highly complex relationships 
between them and through consensus ranked various actors according to influence. 
 
Participants were introduced to power analysis in order to enable them to unravel layers of 
underlying forces and actors influencing their contexts. The intention was to: 
 
(i) Use concepts of visible, hidden and invisible power for contextual analysis. The 
power analysis approach deployed here relies on the concepts of visible, hidden and 
invisible power originally conceived by Lukes and developed by John Gaventa.5 
Visible power refers here to ‘seeing who participates, who wins and who loses in 
these arenas, you can tell who has power. For instance, we can analyse which 
interests are able to maintain debate, whose interests prevail in key decisions, such 
as on a key policy or budget decision, and whose voices and interests are present, 
but have little influence.’6 One of the limitations of focusing exclusively on visible 
ways in which power is exercised is that there is little attention being paid to whose 
voices are not represented and why. 
 
Hidden forms of power ‘are used by vested interests to maintain their power and 
privilege by creating barriers to participation, by excluding key issues from the public 
arena, or by controlling politics “backstage”. They may occur not only within political 
processes, but in organizational and other group contexts as well, such as 
workplaces, NGOs or community-based organizations’.7 
 
Invisible power goes a step further than hidden power because it does not look at the 
issues that are kept off the agenda, but the ways in which ideologies, values and 
forms of behaviour influence how people think and relate to issues. ‘In this form of 
power, people may be unaware of their rights, their ability to speak out, and may 
come to see various forms of power or domination over them as “natural”, or at least 
unchangeable, and therefore unquestioned. Poor people, for instance, may accept 
their circumstance as the status quo even in the face of inequalities around them, 
internalizing dominant explanations of poverty that tell them poverty is “their fault” 
rather than a systemic problem.’8 
                                               
5
 See www.powercube.net for further details. 
6
 For an excellent discussion of the failure to build developmental coalitions in Yemen during Saleh’s regime, 
see Phillips (2011). 
7
 See www.powercube.net. 
8
 The definitions are taken from the powercube, understanding power for social change 
www.powercube.net/analyse-power.  
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This involved translating the concepts into Arabic by the IDS researcher, finding 
nuanced words that would convey the meaning, and thinking of examples to give 
from the Egyptian context to help participants relate the conceptual with the practical. 
Such material can be used for future workshops in Arabic as well. 
 
(ii) Ensure participants were better positioned to identify what levels of power their 
strategies have engaged with so far, and what levels of power they need to engage 
with in future while developing their strategies (including using expressions of power 
such as power with, power within, power to). These concepts derive from 
Veneklessen and Miller www.powercube.net/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/newweave_chapter3.pdf. Again, the concepts were 
translated into Arabic, examples from the Egyptian context presented, etc. 
 
Since the theme was on collective forms of action to address GBV, participants were briefly 
introduced to experiences/lessons/issues that have emerged from a literature review on this 
theme from different global regions and the rationale for focusing on collective action and 
working with men. 
 
5.2 What kind of Gender-based violence concerns us? 
For the analysis of the Egyptian context, participants identified a number of key sites where 
GBV was happening. Participants ranked the spaces through which people were exposed to 
the highest level of GBV as follows: 
 
1. Public spaces such as the streets, public transport and local markets; 
2. Police stations; 
3. Places of worship (again via the messages it propagates); 
4. Schools and universities. 
 
Participants agreed that the media was a cross-cutting driver of GBV rather than a site per se 
and that it should be integrated in all group work. In the first half of the day people were 
divided into three groups, each relating to one of the key sites where GBV was perceived to 
be most prevalent: 
 
1. The street (including public transport and markets); 
2. Police stations;  
3. Places of worship. 
 
Each group addressed the questions: 
 
1. Who are the actors who influence the form of violence? 
2. What forms does the GBV take? 
3. What kind of power levels are at work (visible, hidden, invisible)? 
4. Why does GBV happen in these particular spaces? 
5. What kind of interventions are in place and what is needed? 
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6 Gender-based violence in public spaces 
6.1 Case study 
One of the participants, a young woman in her twenties, spoke about her own experience of 
being the victim of sexual harassment in front of Metro Cinema on the first day of Eid ul-Adha 
feast. Ironically she was there as part of a youth group that had formed and gathered in 
downtown Cairo to monitor acts of sexual harassment and report on them. A young man 
touched her on her leg and then walked away as if he had not done anything. She noted his 
face. A few minutes later, the same young man came and touched her buttocks. She 
stopped him and asked him why he had done that. He denied it and tried to run away but she 
held on to him. They ended up in the police station where the officer in charge discouraged 
her from filing a lawsuit as the young man had apologised to her. She insisted on filing a 
complaint. The next day the young woman, accompanied by a lawyer, went to the General 
Prosecutor’s office to continue the complaint procedure. There a police officer verbally 
abused her and asked her what she was doing in the street in the first place (i.e. implicitly 
questioning her moral conduct). The young man’s mother was also there and she also 
accused the young woman of making up the charges and of spoiling the family’s Eid with her 
nonsense. She cursed her and accused her of amoral character. 
 
When inside the General Prosecutor’s office, the young woman discovered that the file had 
been declared closed. She insisted on pursuing the complaint to court with the accusation of 
‘hatk ‘ard’ (sexual assault). The accused was kept in custody for four days and on his 
release, he and his family went to the area where she lives and initiated a campaign to 
tarnish her reputation. Faced with such violence, her family tried to persuade her to drop the 
charges against the young man so as not to attract more negative attention. They proposed 
an informal reconciliation meeting so that the matter would be brought to an end. When the 
young woman insisted on pursuing the case through the court, her father was extremely 
upset and threatened to pressure her into marrying a much older suitor so as not to have to 
bear responsibility for her any longer. The family was so ashamed of the attention they were 
getting as a consequence of their daughter being called names and having her honour 
questioned that they considered asking her to leave her home and abide elsewhere. 
6.1.1 Who are the victims of gender-based violence in public places? 
A scoping of the perpetrators of violence was particularly helpful to go beyond the stereotype 
of the young unemployed man out on the prowl to ravage an innocent young girl. What is 
particularly interesting is that the number one listed source of harassment happens to be 
children: boys whose ages range from 9–12. Participants were in agreement that this age 
group has taken up harassing women as a form of hobby and an imitation of what they see 
grownups do. Moreover, in addition to men (including married men) participants also 
identified police officers, some sheikhs in the mosques and drivers of public transport. 
Interestingly women belonging to Islamist movements were also cited as perpetrators of 
harassment in some public places, and their intention was to intimidate women from dressing 
in a way that they define as immodest. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
The scoping of the actors also showed that though young girls are the prime targets of 
sexual assault, there are no specifications as to age, attire or status that make women more 
or less vulnerable to assault. Women wearing the face veil have been sexually assaulted, so 
too have elderly women. 
6.1.2 Why do they harass? 
 
 Blind prejudice to women in public spaces as not supposed to be there; 
 For fun, out of boredom; 
 To break a woman’s will/sense of self; 
 To copy others (in particular with respect to young boys). 
6.1.3 What levels of power are involved? 
 
Visible levels of power 
 Direct assault from perpetrator on victim; 
 Resistance from police officer to file complaint and their inclination to let the harasser 
off; 
 Judges who are inclined to rule minimum terns or let harassers off; 
 General Prosecutor. 
 
Hidden levels of power 
 Women who cover up for men who harass; 
 MPs who refuse to put the issue on the agenda; 
 The unfavourable response of the family of the victim of harassment who openly 
declare she is a victim of abuse and insist on filing a complaint; 
 The apathy that characterises society’s response to the harasser; 
 Fear that the harasser (or his gang) would be carrying weapons that they would use 
against those who intervene on behalf of the victim(s). 
 
 Invisible levels of power 
 Social values that blame women for being out on the street for the harassment they 
receive; 
 Religious discourses that demonise women as the seductresses who are 
responsible for men’s actions; 
 Perceptions that if sexual penetration (rape) did not happen, then what is the big 
deal; 
 The hierarchy of violations in which rape is not seen as serious as other ills, for 
example, stealing. 
 
Why does sexual harassment happen? 
 The economic conditions that prevent young men from getting married; 
 The media that encourages sexual violence; 
 Popular sayings; 
 Popular songs. 
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Interestingly, no one mentioned the absence of rule of law and security, reflecting perhaps 
the state of affairs in the country. 
 
6.1.4 Participants identified a number of strategies that need to be pursued 
in engaging with gender-based violence on the streets: 
 Capturing and documenting initiatives and activities; 
 Identifying influential persons in decision-making positions of authority who may 
informally provide support; 
 Awareness-raising to larger sections of the population. 
 
6.1.5 Participants spoke of their use of collective action in their campaigns 
to: 
 Share experience; 
 Mobilise the masses; 
 Put pressure on the police to respond; 
 Break the silence barriers. 
 
6.1.6 Participants cited the following tactics that they have already 
deployed: 
 Stand-ins and protests; 
 Seminars and public events; 
 Street theatre and films; 
 Print-outs and graffiti; 
 Displaying data and information and other communication mechanisms to raise 
awareness among citizens on the streets. 
 
6.1.7 Participants identified the following outcomes as their criteria for 
having achieved success: 
 Coverage in the newspapers and news media; 
 Online coverage; 
 Official television coverage; 
 Responsiveness of people and their joining the campaign; 
 Policymakers’ explicit statements indicating awareness of the issues. 
 
Though activists have been immersed in planning and undertaking interventions, they had 
rarely had a chance to reflect on how they know that they have made a difference. Also given 
that many of the groups are informal, and have only been in existence [at the time of the 
workshop] for a few weeks or months [almost all less than a year] there was much reflection 
on how impact is measured. Generally activists knew they made a difference when 
volunteers expressed a desire to join, when it became a public opinion issue (media and 
press coverage) and when informally people came to express their solidarity with their work. 
 
 
15 
 
6.1.8 Which interventions are addressing violence in public places? 
Participants in the working group cautioned that what works in one part of Egypt does not 
necessarily work in another. Consequently there are no blueprints for nationwide application 
that should be followed, and care is needed to ensure that interventions respond to specific 
contexts. For example, in the Delta city of Damanhour, young women and men formed a 
human chain, standing side-by-side holding flyers with messages against sexual 
harassment. The participant explained that many women and men came to talk to them, 
share their own experiences of sexual harassment, and discuss what needs to be done. 
However, one Cairo-based participant explained that when he and other participants tried to 
form a human chain in downtown Cairo, some gangs and thugs came to deliberately attack 
them, ridiculing their work and sexually harassing the women in the human chain as a show 
of their strength. This needs to be examined however, on a one-to-one basis since human 
chains have sometimes been highly successful in conveying the messages to the wider 
public and in other instances they have put those participating in danger of assault. 
 
Some of the proposed interventions included: 
 
 use of graffiti by drawing pictures and writing messages on the walls of buildings, 
bridges, and large gates in main streets where large numbers of people pass by; 
 production of short films and clips and finding avenues for their dissemination; 
 production of short advertisements on television; 
 legal awareness within society of the criminal code on sexual assault; 
 information sharing productions screened in the street with entertaining messages 
that people can relate to; 
 male peer-to-peer education in particular on the streets, in public transport and in 
local communities; 
 work with local leaders on a community level on publicly condoning such practices. 
 
These proposed interventions largely emanate from the activists’ own experiences (except 
production for short advertisements on television). Participants however, admitted that they 
have had little success in their outreach to local religious leaders. 
 
All participants agreed that men of religion play a highly influential role in Egyptian society – 
now even more than before. Some participants argued that we should identify in each 
community those that sympathise with the issue and invite them to join the anti-harassment 
campaigns. Others urged caution, saying that the same religious leaders who may be willing 
to speak against sexual harassment may also blame young women for inciting men’s 
behaviour and demand that they be more modestly dressed and that they restrict their public 
presence. So caution is needed in how to work with religious leaders so that collaboration is 
built on common ground. 
 
6.1.9 What is needed to move forward? 
The vigilante youth groups who had achieved success on the first day of the Eid had a 
number of characteristics that work in their favour: 
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 They were young men who had achieved immense success in addressing an issue 
that was conventionally exclusively championed by women activists and transforming 
it into an issue of public concern. 
 These young men had appealed to conceptions of manhood and masculinity and had 
used measures that included surveying and reporting, exposing and shaming, 
shielding women through sheer physical presence, as well as pressing police officers 
to intervene. 
 
The challenge now is how to transform a highly successful men- and women-led campaign 
into a social movement with sustained collective action, sustained relevance in the 
community and effectiveness. 
 
A number of key strategic areas for sustained collective action on gender-based violence in 
public spaces were identified. 
 
 Building the internal capacities of the groups so that there is a clear vision, mission, 
strategy and internal communication process. 
 Building the ability of these small groups to work. 
 Building links with other initiatives and civil society organisations. 
 Expanding geographical outreach beyond city centres and into other districts. 
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7 Gender-based violence in police stations 
The relationship between the police and the Egyptian citizenry is a particularly controversial 
one. It is believed that one of the precursors of the Egyptian revolution was the human rights 
violations perpetrated by the police against citizens. Police stations were seen as sites for 
the torture of victims who had no recourse to the rule of law, in view of the immunity that 
police officers seemed to have enjoyed. 
 
During the revolution, there were many acts of vengeance on police officers in particular in 
some Governorates such as Alexandria and Ismailia where the officers who were notorious 
for mistreating citizens were subjected to some brutal attacks and some were even killed. 
 
Such information is based on the author’s own research and discussions with informants. 
However, such a dimension of the Egyptian revolution has yet to feature in the mainstream 
historical narratives which tend to focus on the non-violent nature of the revolutionary forces 
strategies to overthrow the Mubarak regime. 
 
Following the overthrow of Mubarak, there was a security vacuum which all Egyptians 
suffered from, namely, the absence of the police on the streets and in the police stations to 
ensure law and order was maintained. The police, feeling they have been the target of 
Egyptians’ wrath at the time of the ousting of President Mubarak chose to keep a low profile 
or adopt a laissez faire approach to violations of the law occurring around them. In such a 
context, thugs (baltageya) and organised gangs began to roam the streets of Egypt 
terrorising people, stealing and engaging in acts of violence. Citizens began to wish for the 
return of a strong, effective police force that would maintain law and order. Many activists on 
the other hand worried that there had been no government efforts to introduce structural 
reform to the police corps and hence they may return to their old way of doing things. 
Activists are particularly concerned that as people’s desperation for a strong police presence 
increases, the police may feel they have carte blanche to resort to violence and torture once 
again. 
 
The participants who joined the working group on the police force as a site of the exercise of 
gender-based violence believed that one of the reasons why sexual harassment was left 
unchecked on the streets of Egypt was not only the failure of the police to assume law and 
order but their acts of complicity as well, for example by harassing women themselves or by 
letting people caught in the act go free. However, participants were keen not to scapegoat 
the police based in the police stations and hence decided that the actors responsible for GBV 
are ‘All the institutions and departments that are part of the Ministry of Interior’. 
 
In undergoing a power analysis of the Ministry of Interior with respect to why they engage in 
gender-based violence, a number of interesting dynamics came to the fore. The first is the 
educational syllabi taught in the police academies and colleges which encourage the use of 
violence. This was identified as a visible power being exercised, manifest in the substance of 
the material that the police recruits are being taught. Participants identified a hidden form of 
power at work which serves to create a culture of impunity: the solidarity expressed between 
officers who come from the same social class and often from the same families (with the 
practice of passing on the position of officer inter-generationally) (hidden power). Finally an 
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invisible form of power which creates an environment that is tolerant of abuses is the 
deteriorating economic situation which has taken its toll on citizens and police officers alike. 
 
7.1 Sections most vulnerable to violence 
 the poor; 
 poor women; 
 sex workers; 
 underage persons retained for criminal activity and the women among them; 
 non-Muslims, in particular the women among them. 
7.1.1 Ways in which violence is enacted: 
 systematic torture; 
 verbal abuse; 
 gender-based violence towards women and girls; 
 the incarceration of women as a pressure tactic against men; 
 particular forms of torture targeted against women. 
 
The group believed that only structural change will elicit the necessary transformation and 
there are many civil society initiatives that have been proposed to reorganise the Ministry of 
Interior. 
 
A number of observations were made from the wider group, including the importance of 
avoiding generalising about all officers and the Ministry of Interior in its entirety as: 
 
 There are officers who refrain from abuses. 
 We need to also take into account the regional differentials in responses, that is, in 
Upper Egypt, it is more difficult for police to wage violence against citizens because 
the people would respond fiercely en masse to any humiliation of their citizens. 
 It is important to also note the phenomenon of the kidnapping of activists, including 
women activists and their retention in police stations. 
 Harassment of female journalists as a tactic of intimidation. 
 Important to also note ways in which the police collaborated with other forces such as 
the military in Mohamed Mahmoud Street and Tahrir Square to break activists’ will. 
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8 Gender-based violence in places of worship 
Islamic religious actors vary in Egypt. They include Al-Azhar University, the largest Sunni 
learning establishment in the country, the state-regulated mosques, and the mosques that 
are led by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and ultra-radical Salafi movements. The role 
of the mosques in influencing public opinion has increased dramatically after the ousting of 
President Mubarak when restrictions on freedom of expression were removed, and the 
Islamist forces (both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis) increased in political power. 
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have used the mosque as a platform for 
engaging the people on social, cultural and political issues. In view of the fact that the Muslim 
Brotherhood has continued to exist as a religio-political movement, while its party the 
Freedom and Justice party is leading the country, its power of influence through the mosques 
has increased. 
 
This group faced intense difficulties in view of the sensitivity of matters to do with religion. 
Unlike work on gender-based violence in the street or in the police station where as activists 
they have plenty of experience in exposing abuse and demanding accountability, there was 
no precedent within the group on engaging with places of worship as sites where sometimes 
discourses blaming women for their immodest attire are used to explain the prevalence of 
sexual harassment. 
 
The group agreed that there was an invisible level of power being exercised in the form of 
the use of the authority of the pulpit to incite intolerance, and therefore implicitly justify GBV 
violence. It was also pointed out that the authority and power of those who reside over the 
places of worship cannot be underestimated, nor its impact on shaping people’s thinking and 
attitudes. Some of the religious leaders’ discourses on sexual harassment were seen to be 
particularly harmful to condoning acts of assault. For example Sheikh Abd Allah Badr when 
asked about his opinion on the incidents of group assault on women in Eid ul-Fitr said ‘I 
challenge anyone to find me a single incident of a woman in the niqab being harassed. The 
only girls that are harassed are the filthy ones who expose their flesh and wear mini-skirts’. 
Another religious leader blamed a woman for sexual harassment even if she was wearing the 
niqab because she can incite a man through her glances. Another sheikh said that women 
unveiled are like lollypops which attract the flies to them. 
 
Participants noted that these discourses did not only circulate through the mosques but 
through the satellite broadcasting television through which religious leaders reach out to 
Egyptian viewers, some of whom disseminate highly reactionary messages regarding 
women. In terms of actors, those identified as most influential were the sheikhs, the imams, 
the priests and the assistants in the mosques and churches respectively who exercise 
authority over the people (though there was hardly any talk of the church context). The way 
in which they influence is through a combination of visible and invisible power, manifest in 
the: 
 
 weekly Friday sermons; 
 the lessons given in mosque and church; 
 the issuance of haphazard fatwas [religious opinions/edicts] whether directly in face 
to face encounters or through their appearances on satellite television. 
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In terms of interventions, working with religious actors was a task where collective action is 
deemed very difficult since there is no consensus on normative values associated with 
religious prescriptions and prohibitions. For example, the group got locked in an intense 
debate on whether the authorities who prevent a woman from entering a mosque have 
legitimate reasons for doing so or whether they are violating her right to enter unrestricted. 
 
In view of the limited exposure of the population to alternative discourses and sources of 
religious knowledge, there is a high level of vulnerability within the population. The group 
discussed how women and children then become particularly vulnerable to this level of 
invisible power in view of the immense role the places of worship play in shaping their 
perceptions and values. 
 
There was concern with the use of the pulpits for political purposes – that is, to endorse the 
Islamists in power, and how this might affect people’s perception and engagement with 
gender-based violence. Participants noted that religion is now being used in a highly 
systematic manner with the purpose of arousing fear and whipping up people’s sentiments. 
 
Participants also noted that there is also a visible level of power being exercised in places of 
worship characterised by the subjection of children to violence in the form of beatings in 
religious lessons. 
 
 Members of the Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance spoke of their experience in 
engaging with religious leaders (specifically sheikhs) regarding more enlightening fiqh 
(jurisprudence) interpretations and only one of 43 were aware of their existence. A participant 
spoke of an instance where the sheikh preaching a more progressive discourse in the Upper 
Egyptian governorate of Sohag was met with opposition from the public who made a 
complaint against him that he was propagating Shia thinking in the village. 
 
Initiatives that have already been pursued: 
 an intensive six month programme of engagement with religious leaders; 
 spreading ‘enlightened readings of the fiqh’; 
 supporting all movements and actors that are fighting the spread of Wahabi thinking; 
 knowledge sharing encounters with activists working with religious leaders. 
 
8.1 What are some proposed strategies of intervention? 
 
 work towards changing the religious discourse on women’s equality; 
 work with the ma’zouns outside Cairo and build their capacities; 
 building the capacities and knowledge of youth cadres in fiqh issues, Shariah and 
enlightened readings; 
 co-ordination of work with religious movements that endorse a civil state such as 
Azhariyoon ma’ dawla madaniyya, azhariyoon bella hodood, the Sufis, Salafi Costa; 
 work with Sheikh el Azhar especially in the process of their development of the 
declaration on the rights of women commonly known as Wathekat al-Azhar; 
 the importance of pursuing such collaborative work in a collective capacity and not 
through one-to-one engagements which weakens the political weight of the civil 
movements. 
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8.1.1 What is needed to move forward? 
 preparation for a major public event in Abdeen Square with posters, videos and 
graffiti on 25 November to mark international day against violence; 
 organisation of a nationwide stand-in on the same day at the same time in all 
governorates on the occasion. 
 
NB: In view of the highly unstable political environment in Egypt, it was not possible to go 
ahead with either intervention. 
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9 Workshop Day Two 
On the second day, the workshop focused on gender-based violence in Upper Egypt. The 
Upper Egyptian participants who were present on the first day of the workshop but whose 
voices did not influence the agenda setting had an opportunity to share their experiences, 
priorities and issues. 
 
They felt that, while sexual harassment in public places was an issue, it is not the main form 
of GBV to which women are subjected. Sexual harassment did occur in the market place and 
in public transport, but it was often quickly contained through the positive intervention of 
passers-by. 
 
However, participants identified other forms of violation of rights which were becoming 
particularly acute since the Islamists had rise to political office and assumed a dominant 
presence in Upper Egypt. The two most critical issues raised were early marriage and 
polygamy. 
9.1 Early marriage on the rise 
Participants argued that early marriage is a form of gender-based violence because it 
undermines girls’ bodily integrity at a very young age. While traditional rural communities 
have always favoured the early marriage of girls, due to the pressing economic situation and 
the growing belief in girls acquiring at least a secondary school education (up to 18 years 
old), the age of marriage had been rising. However, since the Islamists have become 
increasingly influential in local communities, they have been encouraging families to forgo 
the requirement that girls be educated to secondary level, and contend with their completion 
of preparatory school (age 14). They have also been promoting the early marriage of girls so 
that they would not grow into ‘spinsters’. There is a growing campaign to encourage 
financially able men to take up second wives and encourage parents of young girls to give 
them into marriage as second wives. 
 
Participants said that both phenomena have shaken their communities because they 
challenge the fundamental gains that have been made through decades of community work 
to encourage families to recognise the rights of the girl child to complete her education and 
marry at an age where she has achieved a higher level of emotional and physical maturity. 
 
9.2 Polygamy: a case study 
With respect to polygamy, Hoda, the founder of one of the first community development 
NGOs to work on women’s rights issues in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Qena said that 
she is particularly disturbed by a new phenomenon that she has witnessed, namely, the 
campaign to convince men in her community to take up a Syrian wife. Hoda explained that 
there has been an influx of Syrian refugees into Qena. In the mosques affiliated to the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis she noticed that in the Friday prayers when all the men 
in the villages are congregated, the local imams have been calling upon the believers to take 
on a Syrian wife as a way of alleviating their suffering as a consequence of the war. Hoda 
noted that in Qena, as in the rest of Egypt, polygamy is very rarely practiced. She noted that 
men are struggling with supporting one household, let alone to take on another wife and 
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support another family. In view of their impoverishment, these men who have taken up 
another wife have often brought her to live with their first wives. She said that many women 
have approached her to share their devastation at suddenly having to share their husbands 
with another woman. She said this has had a detrimental psychological, mental and 
economic impact on these women beyond what is spoken about or recognised in the 
communities in which she works in Qena. 
 
Participants agreed with Hoda that this emergent phenomenon [of religious actors 
encouraging men to take up Syrian women as second wives] is not only specific to Qena, but 
is also occurring in other governorates as well. They spoke of the need for a collective action 
approach to addressing these issues that would involve not tackling it as a women’s right 
issue but as an issue of protecting the community and upholding principles of justice and 
fairness. They argued there needs to be a discourse challenging notions of increased 
masculinity with having multiple wives. 
 
9.3 A collective action approach would involve: 
 identifying local leaders and influential persons (men and women) who may be 
sympathetic to challenging early marriage and polygamy and working with them; 
 documenting and researching scrupulously these phenomena and sharing them with 
the media through life stories and relevant data; 
 developing short effective messages against these social practices and targeting 
particular groups such as young men and women in existing programmes/initiatives 
that are ongoing in the community; 
 sharing experiences and best practices between practitioners working in different 
communities. 
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10 Conclusions and ways forward 
The workshop was helpful on many fronts: 
 
First, it was a good networking opportunity for youth groups who tend to be scattered in 
connecting, sharing their experiences, debating contexts and approaches and talking about 
strategies of engagement. 
 
Second, it was the first time for the entire group to be exposed to power analysis, and its 
practical application in their group work enabled them to capture the less ‘visible’ forms of 
power in relation to both understanding their contexts as well as sharpening their strategies 
of intervention. 
 
Third, the workshop brought together a diversity of actors, who were joined together by a 
common aim of combating GBV, but who worked through different means and different 
contexts. 
 
On the other hand, the workshop also exposed a number of challenges: 
 
First, the extremely volatile and highly unpredictable situation in Egypt meant that activists 
that have their feet on the ground found it very difficult to commit time for reflective practice 
nor to afford to strategise and plan in a context that keeps on changing. 
 
Second, while the introduction to power analysis was welcomed, undertaking a couple of 
practical exercises was simply not enough. It had to be woven into their daily practice, 
perhaps through action research. This regrettably required many more follow-up 
interventions which were not feasible. 
 
Third, the workshop exposed the deep chasm that exists between the different kinds of 
actors, the priority issues, and the strategies of engagement between the activists working in 
urban Cairo and those working in Upper Egypt, in particular in rural areas. This would 
obviously have bearings on cross-regional work. 
 
One of the objectives of the workshop was to help IDS identify actors and their initiatives who 
need to be examined and analysed for the country case study. From the workshop it was 
evident that the intervention of the youth groups who had organised and worked collectively 
to address gender-based violence in the form of sexual harassment on the streets of Egypt 
represents an important case study worth examining in greater depth. 
 
It also became evident that collective work in rural areas through community mobilisation of 
men and women against new social practices also offers important lessons in working in 
contexts in which the majority of the Egyptian population live. These would inform the 
selection of the detailed case studies for the next phase of work. 
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